Research chronicle

Many population projections used by international and government agencies assume that, in today's low-fertility societies, future fertility rates will stop declining and roughly stabilize. This paper assesses the evidence for an equilibrium point or rebound from low levels. We show that there is no robust evidence for a systematic fertility rebound, or for a stable equilibrium point at any fertility level conventionally assumed. Instead, where and when fertility has fallen low, it has tended to keep falling. This is true across a range of data sources, time periods, and fertility measures: United Nations data on period total fertility rates for all country-years from 1950 to 2023; Human Fertility Database data on completed fertility for cohorts born between 1935 and 1975 in 31 countries; and fertility rates in subnational geographies in Japan, India, and the United States. We reconcile these results with a prior literature that documented fertility reversals among some low-fertility countries in the early 2000s. Our findings provide an empirical basis for re-examining the equilibrium and rebound assumptions embedded in widely used population projections.

This study examines the impact of demographic factors, particularly declining fertility rates and an aging population, on Japan’s economic growth from 1960 to 2022. Additionally, it analyzes key macroeconomic variables, including healthcare expenditure, interest rates, and inflation, that influence the country’s economy. Using quantitative time-series data and the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), this research evaluates the short- and long-term effects of these variables on economic growth. The findings indicate that, in the long run, population aging and high interest rates significantly negatively affect economic growth. In contrast, healthcare expenditure and moderate inflation have a positive impact. Population aging slows economic expansion by increasing pension and healthcare costs, while high interest rates discourage investment and consumption. Conversely, healthcare expenditure, as an investment in human capital, enhances labor productivity, and moderate inflation stimulates economic activity by promoting consumption and investment. However, in the short term, none of these variables exhibit a significant impact on economic growth, suggesting that policy measures and demographic changes require time to influence the broader economy.

The shrinking of a city evokes an image that the amount of the main urban components, such as public facilities, infrastructure, and built-up areas, also shrinks. However, in reality, even in so-called shrinking cities with declining population, physical and spatial expansion is reported to continue and remain growth-oriented. This study examines whether some main urban components are shrinking in response to population and household decline by analyzing 1709 municipalities in Japan, around 80% of which have already experienced population decline over the past decade (2012–2022). The analyses use two datasets disclosing total quantities of respective urban components at the municipal level in the two endpoint years of 2012 and 2022, employing some simple techniques: correlation, simple regression analysis, and cross-tabulation. The results reveal that public facilities, road networks, and urban areas were supplied accordingly during periods of population growth but no corresponding downsizing occurs during periods of population decline; instead, several population-declining municipalities witness continuous expansion of these three urban components, contradicting the decrease in population and households. This tendency will create an imbalance between population and urban components, raising concerns that excessive public facilities, infrastructure, and urban areas disproportionate to population decline will undermine the efficiency of urban services and increase the burden on administrative and fiscal operations.

Highlights More than one third of married Japanese women report concerns about infertility, and infertility is increasingly cited as a reason for not reaching fertility ideals. Births conceived using medically assisted reproductive treatments have contributed to reducing the ideal–actual fertility gap by about one third. Infertility concerns are increasingly reported across alleducational groups, but highly educated women are more likely than others to seek and receive treatment.

Abstract Despite extensive research on education's relationship with family formation, causal evidence remains limited, particularly for postsecondary education in East Asia. This research note provides novel causal evidence on education's effects on marriage and fertility among Japanese women by exploiting a unique quasi-experimental design based on the 1966 “Firehorse” zodiac superstition. We leverage the mismatch between Japanese school year and calendar year to identify women who benefited from reduced educational competition without being directly affected by the superstition. Using a difference-in-differences approach and comprehensive data on approximately 1.8 million women from multiple administrative sources, we examine the effect of increased educational opportunities across all education levels. Our findings reveal that higher education leads to modest delays in marriage and childbearing—effects that are smaller than previously documented—without increasing lifelong singlehood. Women with more education show higher labor force participation at marriage and marry slightly younger spouses while maintaining traditional marriage practices. These results suggest that education's direct effect on family formation is moderate and that institutional factors beyond education may deserve greater attention in understanding demographic trends in East Asia. Our findings contribute to debates about effective family policies in rapidly aging societies facing declining marriage and fertility rates.

Abstract In this study, we propose and evaluate a new framework for understanding “lowest‐low” fertility in East Asia, emphasizing the link between the desire for children and marriage. Recognizing that delayed and declining marriage is the primary reason for low fertility in the region, we posit that marriage decisions are shaped by intentions or incentives (not) to have children. We evaluate this hypothesis using Japan as a case, a society where parenthood is an integral part of the “package” of normative family expectations accompanying marriage, especially for women. After confirming that attitudes toward marriage and fertility are strongly correlated, we estimate discrete‐time hazard models of first marriage using nationally representative longitudinal data. We find that, net of marriage desires, (1) women and men with no desire to have children marry significantly later than those who desire children, and (2) uncertain attitudes toward parenthood are also associated with later marriage for men, but not women. The link between negative or uncertain fertility desires and delayed marriage among men is partially explained by their lower engagement in efforts to find a marriage partner. These results provide insights for policy discussions about declining fertility in East Asia, especially concerns that pro‐natalist policies are mistargeted.

Evidence for a variety of Asian countries suggests that a common evolutionary pattern occurred in these nations before their modern fertility transitions. Natural fertility improved, infant mortality declined, and simultaneously the age at marriage of women rose. In this paper this evolution is documented for Japan. An hypothesis — a life cycle model of fertility — which accounts for this phenomenon is formulated and evidence to support the thesis is presented.