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Japan

JPN

Population
124.4M
2023 · un-wpp (un-wpp/2024)
Growth rate
-0.48%
2023 · un-wpp (un-wpp/2024)
Fertility rate
1.21
2023 · un-wpp (un-wpp/2024)
Life expectancy
84.7 yrs
2023 · un-wpp (un-wpp/2024)

Total population

Japan19501980201020402070210080M90M100M110M120M130M

un-wpp · un-wpp/2024 · release 2026.08.3

CSV

Population growth rate

Japan195019802010204020702100-0.5%0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%

un-wpp · un-wpp/2024 · release 2026.08.3

CSV

Population pyramid

MaleFemale0-45-910-1415-1920-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-6465-6970-7475-7980-8485-8990-9495-99100+
2023

un-wpp · un-wpp/2024 · release 2026.08.3

CSV

Total fertility rate

Japanreplacement1950198020102040207021001.502.002.503.003.50

un-wpp · un-wpp/2024 · release 2026.08.3

CSV

Life expectancy at birth

Japan19501980201020402070210060.0 yrs70.0 yrs80.0 yrs90.0 yrs

un-wpp · un-wpp/2024 · release 2026.08.3

CSV

Net migration

Japan195019802010204020702100-300k-200k-100k0100k200k300k

un-wpp · un-wpp/2024 · release 2026.08.3

CSV

Median age

Japan19501980201020402070210020.0 yrs30.0 yrs40.0 yrs50.0 yrs

un-wpp · un-wpp/2024 · release 2026.08.3

CSV

Population projection

Japan19501980201020402070210060M80M100M120M

un-wpp · un-wpp/2024 · release 2026.08.3

CSV

Research

AI-generated summary

This study analyzes 1709 Japanese municipalities (2012–2022), most of which experienced population decline, to examine whether urban components like public facilities, road networks, and urban areas shrink correspondingly. Using correlation, regression, and cross-tabulation methods, the study finds that while these components expanded during population growth, they largely failed to downsize during decline, with many municipalities showing continued expansion despite shrinking populations. This mismatch raises concerns about inefficiency in urban services and increased fiscal burdens due to excess infrastructure relative to declining population.

Abstract
The shrinking of a city evokes an image that the amount of the main urban components, such as public facilities, infrastructure, and built-up areas, also shrinks. However, in reality, even in so-called shrinking cities with declining population, physical and spatial expansion is reported to continue and remain growth-oriented. This study examines whether some main urban components are shrinking in response to population and household decline by analyzing 1709 municipalities in Japan, around 80% of which have already experienced population decline over the past decade (2012–2022). The analyses use two datasets disclosing total quantities of respective urban components at the municipal level in the two endpoint years of 2012 and 2022, employing some simple techniques: correlation, simple regression analysis, and cross-tabulation. The results reveal that public facilities, road networks, and urban areas were supplied accordingly during periods of population growth but no corresponding downsizing occurs during periods of population decline; instead, several population-declining municipalities witness continuous expansion of these three urban components, contradicting the decrease in population and households. This tendency will create an imbalance between population and urban components, raising concerns that excessive public facilities, infrastructure, and urban areas disproportionate to population decline will undermine the efficiency of urban services and increase the burden on administrative and fiscal operations.
AI-generated summary

This research note examines how infertility concerns and medically assisted reproduction (MAR) affect Japanese women's ability to reach their ideal family size, finding that over a third of married women report infertility concerns, which are increasingly cited as a barrier to achieving fertility ideals across all educational groups. The study shows that births from MAR treatments have narrowed the gap between ideal and actual fertility by about one third, though highly educated women are more likely to seek and receive such treatment than others.

Abstract
Highlights More than one third of married Japanese women report concerns about infertility, and infertility is increasingly cited as a reason for not reaching fertility ideals. Births conceived using medically assisted reproductive treatments have contributed to reducing the ideal–actual fertility gap by about one third. Infertility concerns are increasingly reported across alleducational groups, but highly educated women are more likely than others to seek and receive treatment.
AI-generated summary

This research note exploits Japan's 1966 "Firehorse" zodiac superstition, combined with mismatches between school and calendar years, as a quasi-experimental instrument to estimate the causal effect of education on marriage and fertility among roughly 1.8 million Japanese women. Using a difference-in-differences approach, the study finds that increased education modestly delays marriage and childbearing—smaller effects than prior research suggested—without raising permanent singlehood, while more educated women show higher labor force participation at marriage and marry slightly younger spouses. The authors conclude that education's direct impact on family formation is moderate, suggesting institutional factors beyond education are important for understanding declining marriage and fertility trends in East Asia and for designing family policy.

Abstract
Abstract Despite extensive research on education's relationship with family formation, causal evidence remains limited, particularly for postsecondary education in East Asia. This research note provides novel causal evidence on education's effects on marriage and fertility among Japanese women by exploiting a unique quasi-experimental design based on the 1966 “Firehorse” zodiac superstition. We leverage the mismatch between Japanese school year and calendar year to identify women who benefited from reduced educational competition without being directly affected by the superstition. Using a difference-in-differences approach and comprehensive data on approximately 1.8 million women from multiple administrative sources, we examine the effect of increased educational opportunities across all education levels. Our findings reveal that higher education leads to modest delays in marriage and childbearing—effects that are smaller than previously documented—without increasing lifelong singlehood. Women with more education show higher labor force participation at marriage and marry slightly younger spouses while maintaining traditional marriage practices. These results suggest that education's direct effect on family formation is moderate and that institutional factors beyond education may deserve greater attention in understanding demographic trends in East Asia. Our findings contribute to debates about effective family policies in rapidly aging societies facing declining marriage and fertility rates.
AI-generated summary

This study proposes a framework linking fertility desires to marriage timing to explain "lowest-low" fertility in East Asia, using Japan as a case study where parenthood is normatively tied to marriage. Using discrete-time hazard models on longitudinal data, the authors find that both women and men without a desire for children marry later than those who desire children, and that uncertain attitudes toward parenthood delay marriage for men (partly due to reduced partner-seeking effort) but not for women. The findings suggest that pro-natalist policies focused solely on married couples may be mistargeted, given the strong connection between fertility intentions and marriage decisions.

Abstract
Abstract In this study, we propose and evaluate a new framework for understanding “lowest‐low” fertility in East Asia, emphasizing the link between the desire for children and marriage. Recognizing that delayed and declining marriage is the primary reason for low fertility in the region, we posit that marriage decisions are shaped by intentions or incentives (not) to have children. We evaluate this hypothesis using Japan as a case, a society where parenthood is an integral part of the “package” of normative family expectations accompanying marriage, especially for women. After confirming that attitudes toward marriage and fertility are strongly correlated, we estimate discrete‐time hazard models of first marriage using nationally representative longitudinal data. We find that, net of marriage desires, (1) women and men with no desire to have children marry significantly later than those who desire children, and (2) uncertain attitudes toward parenthood are also associated with later marriage for men, but not women. The link between negative or uncertain fertility desires and delayed marriage among men is partially explained by their lower engagement in efforts to find a marriage partner. These results provide insights for policy discussions about declining fertility in East Asia, especially concerns that pro‐natalist policies are mistargeted.