Research

Papers, preprints, data releases, and policy documents related to the indicators in this dataset, gathered daily and summarized by AI.

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This study examines how employed, welfare-connected low-income mothers experience significant earnings losses around childbirth, spending roughly six months out of the labor force on average, though Black mothers tend to return sooner. It finds that social welfare programs, if fully utilized, can compensate for lost earnings after birth but not during pregnancy, with most available benefits being non-fungible nutrition assistance.

Abstract
Highlights Employed, social welfare–connected mothers experience a substantial reduction in earnings around a child's birth. Social welfare programs, assuming full take-up, can offset these lost earnings after birth but not during pregnancy. Most social welfare benefits available around birth are nutrition assistance, which are not fungible. These mothers spend about six months out of the labor force, with Black mothers returning earlier, on average.
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This study provides the first comprehensive evaluation of population forecast error for San Diego County and its jurisdictions, analyzing multiple forecast vintages and increment years over more than five decades. It finds that forecast accuracy decreases as the forecast horizon lengthens and is shaped by population growth rate, population size, and jump-off discrepancy, confirming established patterns in the literature while extending them to errors in population change rather than just population level. The analysis also shows that simple naive extrapolation methods often matched or outperformed more complex forecasting approaches, underscoring the value of benchmarking forecast performance.

Abstract
Highlights This study is the first in the San Diego region to evaluate population forecast error across multiple forecast vintages and increment years spanning more than five decades. Forecast accuracy declines with increasing forecast horizon, while forecast errors are also influenced by population growth rate, population size, and jump-off discrepancy. Findings confirm the generalizability of established relationships in the forecast evaluation literature while extending prior research through analysis of errors in population change rather than solely through population level. Simple naive extrapolation methods frequently matched or exceeded the accuracy of more complex forecasting approaches, demonstrating the importance of benchmarking forecast performance.
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This paper traces how the U.S. Census Bureau created public use microdata as part of the 1960 Census, highlighting how the resulting public use sample transformed analysis of the U.S. population and spurred a wave of new census-based research. It emphasizes that collaboration between academics and the Census Bureau, particularly through the Population Association of America, was central to developing this first microdata product, and argues that sustained collaboration remains necessary to keep microdata broadly accessible and usable.

Abstract
Highlights The Census Bureau invented microdata as a product of the 1960 U.S. Census. The 1960 public use sample revolutionized analysis of the U.S. population and led to an outpouring of new census-based research. Interactions between academics and the Census Bureau at the Population Association of America played a central role in development of the first microdata. Continued collaboration between academics and the Census Bureau is needed to ensure broad accessibility and usability of microdata.
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This study uses two survey experiments to test whether the order in which fertility preference questions (general ideal, personal ideal, wanted, and expected fertility) are asked influences respondents' answers. Results show that most measures, especially personal ideal and wanted fertility, are relatively stable and indistinguishable regardless of question order, though expected fertility declines when asked later and personal ideal can shift among older respondents when asked after general ideal. The findings suggest general ideal fertility is a distinct, non-interchangeable construct, and the authors offer guidance for survey design regarding comparability of fertility preference measures across studies.

Abstract
Abstract Fertility preferences offer insights into how social factors shape behavior. Despite their significance, it remains unclear whether preference measures capture distinct, firm constructs in respondents’ minds, or to what extent responses reflect survey design choices like question order. In two survey experiments, we tested whether the sequence of fertility preference measures affected responses. The first experiment manipulated the sequence of general ideal, personal ideal, wanted, and expected fertility among college students. Sequence changes caused no changes in means for these measures, except for expected, which declined when asked later. Personal ideal and wanted fertility were indistinguishable from each other and were fairly unresponsive to sequencing. The second experiment compared general and personal ideals among a sample representative of U.S. adults. Preferences were firm and distinct among reproductive‐age individuals. For older respondents, the measures were equivalent when asked first, but personal ideal declined when asked after general ideal. Across both samples, general ideal fertility remained similar and higher than other measures for reproductive‐age respondents. These findings suggest that most preferences are relatively unaffected by ordering. We also offer guidance for survey design; general ideals are not interchangeable with other preference measures, and fertility expectations may not be comparable across survey designs.
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This study examines lifespans of U.S. immigrants born between 1850 and 1890, finding that while these immigrants generally lived shorter lives than U.S.-born Whites, this mortality disadvantage was concentrated among certain origin groups. Notably, migrants tended to outlive both their origin-country populations and their nonmigrant siblings, with migration-mortality patterns varying based on both origin and destination contexts.

Abstract
Highlights U.S. immigrants born in 1850–1890 had shorter lifespans than U.S.-born Whites. This mortality penalty was concentrated among specific origin groups. Migrants generally outlived origin populations and nonmigrant siblings. Migration–mortality patterns varied by origin, reflecting both origin and destination contexts.
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This research note examines the reliability of retrospective reports on parity and birth dates using repeated measures from a longitudinal U.S. survey. Findings show that while most respondents report consistent parity and birth date information across waves, about one in ten respondents (and one in five parents) report parity inconsistently, and 11% of those with children report differing first birth dates. Such inconsistencies were more common among males and less advantaged respondents.

Abstract
Highlights In a longitudinal survey, most people consistently report parity and birth date information. One in 10 respondents, and one in five parents, report parity inconsistently across waves. Among those who reported children at an earlier wave, 11% report different dates of first birth. Inconsistency in parity and first birth dates was higher among males and less advantaged people.
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Using large U.S. Census and ACS samples from 1940–2013, the authors reanalyze prior findings on assortative mating and the division of labor in marriage. They find robust evidence for changes in the post-marriage division of labor, but more variable evidence on assortative mating, estimating it explains about 29% of earnings homogamy trends, while noting that analytic choices like the definition of newlyweds and handling of missing values significantly affect results.

Abstract
Highlights We use the large samples of U.S. Census and ACS data from 1940–2013 to conduct a reanalysis. The evidence for changes in the division of labor after marriage is robust. The evidence on assortative mating is more variable, even in large samples. Our best estimate is that assortative mating explains 29% of earnings homogamy trends. The definition of newlyweds and treatment of missing values are consequential.
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This study examines how shifting partnership patterns have contributed to recent fertility change across several European Union countries and the United States between 2005 and 2020, using a Kitagawa decomposition to separate composition (partnership exposure) effects from rate (within-union fertility) effects. The analysis finds that declining marriage and cohabitation rates reduced total fertility rates in every country studied, even in nations where overall fertility rose, indicating that fertility trends stem not only from changes in childbearing behavior within unions but also from reduced exposure to union-based childbearing. The findings underscore the need to consider union formation dynamics when explaining contemporary fertility change.

Abstract
We study the contribution of changing partnership patterns to recent fertility change. Using data for several European Union countries and the United States, we analyze fertility developments between 2005 and 2020. Applying a Kitagawa decomposition, we separate fertility changes into a composition component, i.e., shifts in partnership exposure, and a rate component, i.e.,changes in fertility within partnership statuses. We find that declines in marriage and cohabitation reduced total fertility rates in every country studied, including those where overall fertility increased. These results suggest that fertility trends cannot be understood solely as changes in childbearing behavior within unions, but also reflect a contraction in exposure to childbearing. Hence, the results highlight the importance of understanding union formation dynamics for explaining contemporary fertility change.
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This paper examines the long-term decline in fertility across rich countries, noting U.S. and European birthrates have been below replacement since the mid-1970s, with cohort fertility falling between those born in 1955 and 1975. It argues this decline stems from increased female autonomy combined with a mismatch between men's and women's preferences, since men tend to benefit more from traditional arrangements while women benefit more from departing from them. When men are unlikely to abandon traditions, some career-oriented women forgo or delay having children.

Abstract
The fertility decline is everywhere in the world today and goes back decades for rich countries. Birthrates have been below replacement in the U.S. and Europe since the mid-1970s. Completed cohort fertility in the U.S. was lower for those born in 1955 than for 1975. The reasons for the initial declines involve greater female autonomy and a mismatch between the desires of men and women. Men generally benefit more from maintaining traditions; women often benefit more from eschewing them. When the probability is low that men will abandon traditions, some career women will not have children and others will delay.<br><br>Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w35425" TARGET="_blank">www.nber.org</a>.<br>
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This study is the first to link extreme temperatures with unclaimed deaths in New York City, using daily air and wet-bulb temperature data matched to public burial records. Findings show that a 1°F increase over a 7-day summer period predicts 1.2% more unclaimed deaths, and decedents on extreme heat days were up to three times more likely to go unclaimed, highlighting heightened mortality risk among vulnerable urban populations during extreme heat.

Abstract
Highlights This is the first study to examine the link between extreme temperatures and unclaimed deaths in New York City. Daily air and wet-bulb temperatures were paired with public burial records. A 1°F hotter 7-day summer period predicts 1.2% more unclaimed deaths. Decedents on extreme heat days in NYC were up to three times as likely to go unclaimed.
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This study uses a novel cohort discontinuity design to estimate the causal impact of the Great Recession on U.S. fertility, examining single-year birth cohorts of women overall and by race (White and Black). The findings show negative fertility effects for women born between 1964 and 1992, with the largest declines observed among younger cohorts and Black women.

Abstract
Highlights This article presents causal effects of the Great Recession on U.S. fertility. Effects are identified using a new cohort discontinuity design. The design identifies effects for single-year cohorts of women, as well as for single-year cohorts of White and Black women. Estimated effects are negative for U.S. women born in the period 1964‒1992. Negative effects are largest for younger cohorts and for Black women.
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This study investigates how chronic conditions contribute to the widening gap in disability and mortality between adults with and without a college degree from 2002 to 2018. It finds that while chronic disease prevalence rose similarly across educational groups, the relationships linking these diseases to disability and mortality diverged by education level, driving the growing disparities. The authors note these diverging patterns are not mainly explained by differences in health behaviors or insurance coverage.

Abstract
Highlights I examine the role of chronic conditions in the widening educational health gap. The prevalence of chronic conditions increases similarly for adults with and without a college degree. Links between chronic diseases, disability, and mortality have evolved differently across educational strata. These differences contribute to the widening educational gaps in disability and mortality. These patterns are not driven primarily by health behaviors or insurance coverage.
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This research note addresses the challenge of accurately projecting race group populations, using the Census Bureau's implausibly low 2050 projection for the American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) population as an example. The author argues that standard cohort component models fail because they ignore race response change—shifts in racial identification due to complex identities or administrative processes—and introduces a method to incorporate this factor. Applying this approach to the AIAN population, the study projects growth from 9.7 million in 2020 to 19.8 million by 2050, a much higher estimate than the Census Bureau's figure of 8.7 million.

Abstract
Abstract Demographers have struggled to make realistic population projections for some race groups. For example, the Census Bureau's 2023 national projection gives the unrealistically low estimate that the American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) population will be 8.7 million in 2050 (it was measured at 9.7 million in 2020). I argue that this disconnect occurs because the cohort component model ignores an important component of change: race response change (whether due to complex identities or administrative processes). This research note introduces a strategy for incorporating net race response change into cohort component model projections. I apply the strategy to the racially identified AIAN population in the United States from 2020 to 2050, concluding that it may grow from 9.7 million in 2020 to 19.8 million in 2050.
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Using CPS data from 1963–2023, the study compares posttax, posttransfer household income at ages 36–40 across five generations of Americans. It finds that income growth has slowed for younger generations, mainly due to stalled increases in women's work hours, though Millennials still saw 20% higher median income than the prior generation, with lifetime income gains outweighing rising educational costs.

Abstract
Abstract Whether each generation of Americans continues to economically surpass the previous one has recently been called into question. We construct a posttax, posttransfer income measure from 1963 to 2023 based on the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement that allows us to consistently compare the economic well-being of five generations of Americans at ages 36–40. We find that Millennials had a real median household income that was 20% higher than that of the previous generation, a slowdown from the growth rate of the Silent Generation (36%) and Baby Boomers (26%), but similar to that of Generation X (16%). The slowdown for younger generations largely resulted from stalled growth in work hours among women. Progress for Millennials younger than 30 has also remained robust, though largely due to greater reliance on their parents. Additionally, lifetime income gains for younger generations far outweigh their higher educational costs.
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This study uses U.S. Census data linked to administrative death records to examine how well early-adulthood sociodemographic characteristics predict individual lifespan among a cohort of men born in 1910, observed through deaths between 1975 and 2005 (N=121,000). Despite well-documented group-level disparities in life expectancy tied to structural forces like racism and class inequality, the analysis finds that these characteristics explain less than two percent of overall individual-level variation in lifespan. The findings reinforce that between-group variance in life expectancy is small relative to within-group variation, underscoring the nondeterministic nature of how structural inequality shapes individual mortality outcomes.

Abstract
Abstract There are striking disparities in life expectancy across sociodemographic groups in the United States, shaped by structural forces such as racism, class inequality, and policy environments. To what extent do sociodemographic characteristics structure—or fail to structure—individual lifespans? Using U.S. Census data linked to administrative death records, we assess how well early‐adulthood social, economic, and demographic characteristics predict individual lifespan in a cohort of men born in 1910 and observed through their deaths between 1975 and 2005 ( N = 121,000). Despite large group‐level disparities, we find that sociodemographic characteristics measured in early adulthood explain less than two percent of the overall variation in individual lifespan. These findings reaffirm a central demographic regularity: variance in life expectancy between groups is small compared to variation in lifespan within groups. This highlights the fundamentally nondeterministic nature of how structural inequality shapes individual mortality.
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Using 2006–2023 American Community Survey data, this study finds that the long-standing rise in nonmarital births plateaued during the 2010s, as married women became increasingly more likely than unmarried women to have children, especially among those with a high school education or less. These results challenge deinstitutionalization theories of marriage, suggesting marriage norms remain influential and that declining marriage rates are contributing to the overall decline in U.S. birth rates.

Abstract
Abstract Prevailing theories of family change and the relevance of marriage in the United States hinge on the steady rise in births to unmarried women that unfolded during the latter half of the twentieth century and into the 2000s. This increase was concentrated among individuals with lower education levels, raising concern about inequality in children's family circumstances. Despite theoretical expectations that this trend would continue, the proportion of births to unmarried women plateaued during the 2010s. By examining trends in union formation and childbearing patterns by union status using data from the 2006‒2023 American Community Survey, this study investigates the ongoing link between marriage and childbearing underlying this plateau. Birth and marriage rates fell throughout the 2010s. However, in a reversal, married women became increasingly likely to have children relative to their unmarried peers, particularly among those with a high school education or less. These findings challenge theories about the changing social meaning of marriage, suggesting that norms regarding marriage remain robust rather than becoming deinstitutionalized. Furthermore, this study highlights how the declining marriage rate has contributed to the ongoing decline in the birth rate in the United States, implying that barriers to marriage may also create barriers to childbearing.
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This research note examines 170 years (1850–2021) of U.S. living arrangements by combining life expectancy data with harmonized IPUMS microdata to calculate expected life years spent alone, with primary kin, or in extended households, broken down by sex, age, and cohort. The analysis identifies three historical eras: a "large household" period (1850–1940) marked by stable extended households absorbing life expectancy gains, a "primary kin" era (1940–1980) featuring rapid growth in life years spent with immediate family and declining extended households, and a "diversified" phase (1980–onward) marked by declining two-parent households and increasing diversity in arrangements, including living alone and with extended kin.

Abstract
Abstract Over the past 170 years, the United States has undergone demographic, structural, and cultural changes that are reflected in—and a reflection of—changes in living arrangements. In this research note, we link living arrangements and life expectancy to calculate expected life years spent across different living arrangements by sex for the U.S. population for the period 1850–2021. We decompose changes in this measure by age group and describe change across cohorts. We use harmonized data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples, classifying living arrangements into alone, with primary kin only (partners, parents, and children), and in extended households; more detailed subcategories include, for example, single-parent households and extended families. Three historical ages of U.S. living arrangements emerge: a “large household” system (1850–1940) characterized by relative stability in the extended household, when primary kin arrangements incorporate the majority of the substantial gains in life expectancy; an era of “primary kin” dominance (1940–1980) when life years spent only with primary kin increase faster than life expectancy, while the prevalence of extended households declines; and a “diversified” phase (1980–onward) characterized by a decline in two-parent households in favor of greater diversity, including living alone and with extended family.
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This study uses 2010–2019 American Community Survey data to examine marriage patterns among multiracial individuals, focusing on rates of racial endogamy and "partial endogamy" (sharing one racial component with a partner) after adjusting for group size and demographic controls. Findings show that exact and partial racial endogamy are common among multiracial people, with no evidence that they show a general affinity for other multiracial partners without shared ancestry or that race matters less in their partner choices compared to monoracial individuals. The results suggest that racial classification and established racial boundaries remain influential in shaping marriage markets even as racial categories grow more ancestrally complex.

Abstract
Abstract Research on interracial marriage has only begun to incorporate the growing mixed-race population. Using the 2010–2019 pooled American Community Survey, we explore the likelihood of a range of spousal pairings relative to racial endogamy for multiracial people while accounting for group size and controls for education, age, and immigration status. A distinguishing feature of marriage for multiracial individuals is the possibility of a partial overlap in racial identification—having one component race in common with one's partner. We find that exact racial endogamy for many multiracial individuals is relatively quite high, once we adjust for group size, and that partial endogamy through overlap increases the likelihood of a union. Furthermore, partial overlap in racial identification between multiracial and monoracial partners reveals the importance of racial classification regimes determining how multiracial individuals are treated in the marriage market. We find no evidence of a general affinity among multiracial individuals who do not share racial ancestry or that multiracial individuals’ partner choices are less affected by race than the choices of monoracial individuals. These patterns have implications for the significance of established racial boundaries and the ongoing churning of racial categories, even as those categories become more ancestrally complex.
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This study projects the demographic impacts of a 2025 executive order ending birthright citizenship for children of certain noncitizen parents. It finds that Latinos would bear the largest absolute impact, comprising nearly 80% of new "unauthorized" births short-term and over 90% by 2050, while Asians would face the largest relative impact due to their higher share of temporary visa holders, with 41 unauthorized births per 1,000 unauthorized Asians compared to 17 per 1,000 among Latinos. The authors call for greater understanding of the societal implications of these disparate effects on millions of children and families.”

Abstract
Abstract In January 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order that would redefine the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment by discontinuing birthright citizenship for future children born to certain noncitizen parents. Prior research estimates that ending birthright citizenship would increase the “unauthorized,” or otherwise precarious noncitizen, population by 2.5 million in one decade. We show that the largest absolute impact of ending birthright citizenship would affect Latinos, who would compose nearly 80% of “unauthorized” births in the short term and more than 90% of U.S.-born “unauthorized” people by 2050, expanding the projected size of the Latino unauthorized population by nearly 30%. This projected increase is attributable to the fact that Latinos currently make up the largest share of unauthorized immigrants. After accounting for population size, however, we show that the Asian population would experience the largest relative impact of ending birthright citizenship, especially in the near future. Specifically, we project 41 “unauthorized” births per 1,000 unauthorized Asians, compared with 17 “unauthorized” births per 1,000 among Latinos. This disparate relative impact on Asians stems from their much larger share of temporary nonimmigrant visa holders, whose U.S.-born children would be newly classified as “unauthorized” under the executive order. These disparate absolute and relative impacts on millions of children and their families deserve a fuller understanding of the associated societal implications.
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This study examines how residential racial segregation and its spatial clustering shape individuals' choices of frequently visited (activity) neighborhoods, comparing White and Black residents in Chicago using discrete choice models. Findings show that all groups tend to gravitate toward White contiguous segregated cluster (CSC) neighborhoods—White residents show geographic isolation by avoiding Black areas, while Black residents from Black CSC areas often choose activity locations in White CSC neighborhoods due to greater institutional, amenity, and safety advantages. The results, robust to alternative model specifications, have implications for understanding routine mobility patterns and designing desegregation policies via behavioral nudges.

Abstract
Abstract Despite considerable focus on clustering as a dimension of segregation and the explosion of big location data, the extant literature has not explicitly examined residential racial segregation and the clustering of racially segregated space as an influence on mobility. Drawing on urban sociological theories, we test criteria contributing to individuals’ selection of key activity neighborhoods. Using a range of spatial data sources, we compare White and Black individuals’ choice of frequently visited neighborhoods in Chicago, stratified by whether residing in a contiguous segregated cluster (CSC). Discrete choice models show evidence for the impact of clustered residential segregation in individual decision-making. Net of distance, all groups are drawn to White CSC neighborhoods. White residents exhibit a pattern of geographic isolation, gravitating toward White CSC tracts and away from Black spaces, CSC and non-CSC alike. Black residents of Black CSC neighborhoods are more likely to have activity locations in White CSC neighborhoods than their own residential CSC, largely because of the relative institutional, amenity, and crime-related advantages of these areas. Results are robust to alternative specifications of choice sets and institutional deficits. Implications for understanding the social context of routine location choice and designing desegregation policies through behavioral “nudges” are discussed.
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This study uses 12 statistical and machine learning models with over 150 predictors from the U.S. Health and Retirement Study to predict individual-level lifespan, finding that despite comparable and relatively high discriminative accuracy across models, most individual-level lifespan heterogeneity remains unexplained. The authors identify consistent inequalities in mortality predictability, with lower accuracy for men, non-Hispanic Blacks, and less-educated individuals, who also show less accurate subjective predictions of their own lifespan, while top predictive features (habits, health history, finances) are similar across groups. The findings highlight the inherent limits of individual mortality prediction even with rich longitudinal data and underscore context-dependent inequalities relevant to future research and public policy.

Abstract
Abstract Individual-level mortality prediction is a fundamental challenge with implications for life planning, health care, social policies, and public spending. Drawing from the growing body of research on the predictability of life course events, we model and predict individual-level lifespan using 12 statistical and machine learning models and more than 150 predictors derived from the U.S. Health and Retirement Study longitudinal data. Statistical and machine learning models report comparable accuracy and relatively high discriminative performance, but they fail to account for most lifespan heterogeneity at the individual level. We observe consistent inequalities in mortality predictability and risk discrimination, with lower accuracy for men, non-Hispanic Blacks, and low-educated individuals. Additionally, people in these groups show lower accuracy in their subjective predictions of their own lifespan. Finally, top features across groups are similar, with variables related to habits, health history, and finances being relevant predictors. We conclude by highlighting the limits of predicting mortality from one of the richest longitudinal representative surveys in the United States, as well as the context-dependent inequalities across sociodemographic groups, and providing baselines and guidance for future research and public policies.
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This study uses a Bayesian multistate life table approach with Health and Retirement Study data (1992–2018) to examine racial, ethnic, and sex differences in marital status and living arrangements after age 50. Findings show White adults typically spend most later years married and living with a spouse, Black adults spend the least time in marriage/spousal coresidence and more time alone or with nonspouse family, and Hispanic adults fall in between with notable time in multigenerational households; minority women experience especially reduced years of marriage and spousal coresidence compared to men. The authors argue these disparities highlight the need for policies that account for diverse family structures supporting aging populations.

Abstract
Abstract We employ an innovative Bayesian multistate life table approach to examine how race, ethnicity, and sex shape marital status and living arrangements in later life. Using the Health and Retirement Study (1992–2018), we estimate expected years spent in various marital and living arrangements after age 50. Our findings reveal stark disparities: White adults largely follow traditional patterns, spending most of their later years married and living with a spouse. In contrast, Black adults experience the shortest durations of marriage and spousal coresidence, spending much of later life alone or with nonspouse family members. Hispanic adults occupy an intermediate position, maintaining substantial years in marriage while also spending extended time in multigenerational households. These patterns are further stratified by sex, with minority females experiencing significantly fewer years married and living with a spouse than males, amplifying their reliance on alternative family support structures. These findings highlight how the intersection of race, ethnicity, and sex shapes later life social and economic security, emphasizing the need for policies that account for diverse family structures in aging populations.
AI-generated summary

This study estimates racial and ethnic welfare disparities among older Americans using longitudinal data and an expected utility framework that accounts for consumption, leisure, health, mortality, and wealth. The findings show that inequality is understated by traditional measures like consumption or life expectancy alone, and that most of the welfare gap stems from conditions already present by age 60 rather than differences in how people age afterward. The authors conclude that reducing late-life health risk factors like hypertension or diabetes has only a marginal effect on closing these gaps, suggesting that policies targeting earlier stages of the life cycle would be more effective.

Abstract
Abstract We estimate racial and ethnic disparities in well-being among older Americans using longitudinal data and an expected utility framework that incorporates differences in consumption, leisure, health, mortality, and wealth. Our analysis broadly indicates that racial and ethnic inequality is greater than suggested by other welfare metrics such as consumption or life expectancy alone. Decomposition exercises show that a majority of the estimated welfare gaps are determined by age 60 initial conditions as opposed to racial and ethnic differences in dynamic processes after age 60. Additional counterfactuals suggest that eliminating common heath risk factors such as hypertension or diabetes in late life only marginally closes overall welfare gaps. These simulations suggest that policies aimed at closing racial and ethnic gaps in late life may be more successful and efficient if targeted earlier in the life cycle.