China

Against the backdrop of a sustained decline in marriage and birth rates in China and intensifying gender tensions, traditional explanations centered on individual preferences or gender norms are insufficient to account for the structural mechanisms involved. Drawing on the economics of marriage and the family, this paper examines how rising costs of housing, weddings, bride price, childbearing, and education affect men's decisions to enter marriage, as well as how the expansion of higher education, the shortage of standardized professional employment, and the motherhood penalty shape women's opportunity costs associated with marriage. Building on these factors, together with declining expectations of economic growth, changing lifestyle expectations, and the rising utility of singlehood as an alternative, the paper proposes the “Dual Marriage Costs–Expectation Mismatch Integrated Model” (the Di Formula) and uses “marital surplus” to characterize the comprehensive net benefits of marriage relative to singlehood. The paper argues that contemporary gender relations in China involve more than a conflict of values, but separately rising direct marriage costs for men and opportunity costs for women, together with a widening structural mismatch between modernity-based expectations and real resource constraints. When marital surplus declines and eventually becomes negative, individually rational decisions to postpone or forgo marriage may, in aggregate, contribute to declining marriage and birth rates and intensified gender tensions. Marriage is therefore increasingly shifting from a traditional mechanism of family cooperation toward a high-cost, high-risk, long-term economic decision.

Against the backdrop of a sustained decline in marriage and birth rates in China and intensifying gender tensions, traditional explanations centered on individual preferences or gender norms are insufficient to account for the structural mechanisms involved. Drawing on the economics of marriage and the family, this paper examines how rising costs of housing, weddings, bride price, childbearing, and education affect men's decisions to enter marriage, as well as how the expansion of higher education, the shortage of standardized professional employment, and the motherhood penalty shape women's opportunity costs associated with marriage. Building on these factors, together with declining expectations of economic growth, changing lifestyle expectations, and the rising utility of singlehood as an alternative, the paper proposes the “Dual Marriage Costs–Expectation Mismatch Integrated Model” (the Di Formula) and uses “marital surplus” to characterize the comprehensive net benefits of marriage relative to singlehood. The paper argues that contemporary gender relations in China involve more than a conflict of values, but separately rising direct marriage costs for men and opportunity costs for women, together with a widening structural mismatch between modernity-based expectations and real resource constraints. When marital surplus declines and eventually becomes negative, individually rational decisions to postpone or forgo marriage may, in aggregate, contribute to declining marriage and birth rates and intensified gender tensions. Marriage is therefore increasingly shifting from a traditional mechanism of family cooperation toward a high-cost, high-risk, long-term economic decision.

Monday, 26 October 2026 - 9:00am Overview The meeting on Measuring the Generational Economy: National Inclusion Accounts for Inclusive Policymaking is co-organized by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. It builds on a Development Account project supporting the implementation of National Inclusion Accounts in eight pilot countries across two regions: Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Uruguay in Latin America and the Caribbean; and Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives and Viet Nam in Asia and the Pacific. These countries represent diverse stages of the demographic transition and varying levels of economic development, offering a rich basis for comparative learning and policy dialogue. Through their work, the pilot countries demonstrate the potential of National Inclusion Accounts to generate policy-relevant evidence on inequality, intergenerational support and the distribution of resources across population groups. The meeting will provide a platform to present country results, exchange experiences, and discuss how National Transfer Accounts and its extensions can be used to support fiscal planning, social protection, inclusive growth and long-term policymaking. The objective of the meeting is to introduce National Inclusion Accounts as a new extension of the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) framework and to showcase results from eight pilot countries supported under the Development Account project, a collaboration of DESA, ECLAC and ESCAP. The meeting will provide a strategic overview of NTA and its related extensions — National Time Transfer Accounts and National Inclusion Accounts — as decision-support tools for fiscal planning, social protection, inclusive growth and long-term policymaking. It will highlight how these frameworks generate evidence on the respective roles of governments, families and markets in supporting individuals across the life course. The meeting will also provide an opportunity for policymakers and partners to share policy applications of National Transfer Accounts and its extensions, including how these tools can inform responses to population ageing, inequality, unpaid care work, intergenerational support, and the design of more inclusive and sustainable policies.   Document Concept note   Organization of work Monday, 26 October 2026     Morning session — Chair: DESA (Cheryl Sawyer, Chief, Population Trends And Analysis Branch, UNDESA Population Division)   9.00 – 9.20 a.m. Welcome Remarks United Nations: Lin Yang, Deputy Executive Secretary, ESCAP    China National Committee on Ageing: Madam Lv Xiaoli, Vice Commissioner, CNCA  HelpAge International: Eduardo Klein, Regional Director, HelpAge    9.20 – 10.15 a.m. Population Ageing: Global, Regional and Country Responses Nicole Mun Sim Lai, Population Affairs Officer, UNDESA Population Division.  Global population ageing: the role of DESA      Sabine Henning, Chief, Sustainable Demographic Transition Section, ESCAP.  Population ageing in Asia and the Pacific: the role of ESCAP ECLAC.  Population ageing in Latin America and the Caribbean: the role of ECLAC China National Committee on Ageing.  Responding to population ageing in China: policies, progress and future outlook Q & A   10:15 – 10:25 a.m. Group Photo   10:25 – 10:45 a.m Coffee Break   10:45 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. National Inclusion Accounts in Latin America and the Caribbean Moderator: Raul Holz, Senior Researcher, ECLAC Colombia        Costa Rica      Jamaica         Uruguay         Q & A           12:00 – 13:30 p.m.      Lunch Break     Afternoon session: Chair: ESCAP   13:30 – 15:15 p.m. Policy Panel Discussion: Population Ageing — NTA, NTTA and NTA-I Moderator: Nicole Mun Sim Lai, Population Affairs Officer, UNDESA Africa perspective: Senior country representatives from Africa     Asia perspective: Eduardo Klein, Regional Director, HelpAge; Professor Sang-Hyop Lee, University of Hawaii at Manoa Europe perspective: Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, President, Government Population Council (GPC), Poland     Latin America and the Caribbean perspective: Two senior representatives from Latin America and the Caribbean     Q & A (Discussant: Professor Long, Viet Nam)    15:15 – 15:35  p.m. Coffee Break   15:35 – 16:50 p.m. National Inclusion Accounts in Asia and the Pacific Moderators: Marco Roncarati, Social Affairs Officer, ESCAP; Napaphat Satchanawakul, Social Affairs Officer, ESCAP China: Professor Shen Ke, Fudan University Lao PDR Maldives Viet Nam Q & A    16:50 – 17:00 p.m.   Closing Remarks & Next Steps Cheryl Sawyer, UNDESA    

China’s 2025 reform raises some of the world’s lowest retirement ages. A birth-cohort simulation estimates that the reform holds the statutory working-age population roughly flat through the mid-2030s, keeping 48 million more people below retirement thresholds in 2035 and peaking near 67 million in 2043. Stability ends after the mid-2030s, but the effect remains large in the 2040s. The reform’s ultimate value depends on participation, demand, and artificial intelligence.